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In a wistful panegyric to Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-
-1997), published on the 28th of December 1997, Le 
Monde recalled his solemn political resolve: “Whatever 
happens, I will remain first and above all a revolution-
ary.” (Anon. 2004) Castoriadis, one of the most important 
thinkers and prolific writers on the French intellectual 
scene, must have been well aware of the irony surround-
ing his adamant self-identification. A philosopher of 
an astonishing scope and almost encyclopedic breadth 
of knowledge, he is widely remembered today as the 
“anti-Marxist revolutionary” who co-founded the jour-
nal and political group SocialismeouBarbarie (in 1948) 
and championed his “politics of autonomy” against both 
Soviet Marxism and critical Trotskyism. Yet, even a cur-
sory glance at Castoriadis’ oeuvre reveals an astounding 
array of intellectual interests, ranging from classical phi-
losophy and Freudian psychoanalysis to contemporary 
theoretical developments in economics, biology and 
mathematics. It is with this in mind that we can truly 
appreciate the “event” of the publication of Postscript 
on Insignificance, an English translation of a collection 
of Castoriadis’ dialogues with leading figures in these 
various disciplines. Originally radio broadcasts, these in-
terchanges include an interview of Castoriadis by Daniel 
Mermet (broadcasted in 1996), as well as discussions with 
Octavio Paz (poet), Jean-Luc Donnet (psychoanalyst), 
Alain Connes (mathematician), Francisco Varela (biolo-
gist) and Robert Legros (philosopher). These dialogues 
were all broadcasted in the period from March 1990 to 
July 1996 on “Rejoinders” (France Culture). A testimo-
ny to Castoriadis’ philosophical curiosity, Postscript to 
Insignificance introduces the English reader not only to 
his remarkable intellectual span, but also to the myriad 
possible ways in which these sundry ruminations can 
puzzle together into Castoriadis’ grand philosophical 
scheme: the project of autonomy.
A paradigm case of a systematic philosopher, Castoriadis 
placed ontology at the very center of his theoretical 
edifice. As he vividly put it in his late essay Done and 
Be Done (1989; cf. Castoriadis1997, 361), his concern 
in ontology was not a consequence of his passion to 
“save the revolution,” but of his willingness to save his 
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coherency. The main pillar of this ontological castle keep 
was Castoriadis’ understanding of Being as “creation.”1 
In order to think the emergence of the “radically new,” he 
eschewed both “physicalist” ontologies (reducing society 
and history to nature) and what he called “logicism” (ac-
counting for social and historical forms as combinations 
of a finite number of discrete elements).2 Truly grasping 
the emergence of the “new,” Castoriadis opined, necessi-
tated understanding creation as undetermined, uncaused 
and unmotivated. Creation, to use his famous bon mot, 
is ex nihilo; it is neither deducible nor producible from 
conditions of the anterior system. (Castoriadis 1997, 321) 
This wholesome rejection of the age-old philosophical 
maxim “ex nihilo nihil” was, for Castoriadis, tantamount 
to rejecting the exclusivity of what he idiosyncratically 
called “ensemblistic-identitary (ensidic) logic,” the logic 
of set-theory. While “ensidic” logic corresponds to an or-
ganizable and determinate stratum of Being, this stratum, 
Castoriadis was obstinate, does not exhaust Being. The 
ontological remainder, charmingly dubbed “the mag-
matic” in his mathematical writings, is both that which 
transcends “ensidic” logic and which renders the creation 
of the “radically new” possible. “Magmas” are indeter-
minate and irreducible to the formalization of set-theory, 
an inchoate stratum of Being that prevents the determin-
istic closure of the physical world. 3
But, Castoriadis’ chief philosophical import was his 
discussion of the mode this universal creation takes in 
human Being: “the radical imagination.” The imaginary, 
not merely a reproductive or a combinatory faculty, is a 
wellspring of incessant creation of figures and images, 
an “undetermined” production of social-historical and 
psychic forms. (Rockhill 2011, xiii) Man, endowed with 
this creative capacity of the psyche, can be understood as 
a “universal creator,” a manufacturer of imaginary con-
ceptual and normative systems, of values, religions and 
identities. For Castoriadis however, this radical creation 
was always social in character; the unremitting produc-
tion of historical forms could not be separated from the 
primordial socialization of the psyche. (ibid., xiv) The 
radical imaginary was, at bottom, a social imaginary. 
Society, Castoriadis wrote in his memorable The Social 
Imaginary and the Institution, “cannot be thought within 
any of the traditional schemata of coexistence… what 
is given in and through history is not the determined 
sequence of the determinate but the emergence of radi-
cal alterity, immanent creation, non-trivial novelty.” 
(Castoriadis 1997, 214) This creative overflowing of the 
social is nothing but society’s own “self-creation,” the 
institution of the historical ex nihilo. Social-historical 
forms are not “determined” by natural and historical 
conditions, they are an expression of the boundless cre-
ativity of the “anonymous collective.” (Rockhill 2011, 
xv) Pace Marx, there simply are no laws of history. Yet, 
this groundlessness of the nomos introduces a familiar 
anxiety in the heart of the political. With an absence of 
external justification of social institutions, societies are 
tempted to cover over this abyss of freedom. They at-
tribute the creation of social norms to diverse external 
forces - gods, ancestors, nature etc. The distinct Sartrean 
flavor of this assertion is paired with a sweeping gener-
alization of Castoriadis’: almost every society that has 
existed has been “heteronomous” in this sense, failing to 
live up to the truth of society’s self-creation.4 It was only 
in the Greco-Western tradition that we have witnessed 
the establishment of the project of political autonomy. 
Solely within the confines of this tradition does politics 
proper appear, the taking of responsibility for the creation 
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of social and normative institutions. Political autonomy 
is not only the cornerstone of the democratic idea; it is a 
form of ethical self-consciousness.
It is precisely the compromise of this self-conscious-
ness that motivates Castoriadis’ exchanges with Daniel 
Mermet and Octavio Paz in Postscript on Insignificance. 
Broadcasted in the aftermath of Castoriadis’ publica-
tion of The Rising Tide of Insignificance (1996), they 
are centered around his sweeping claim that modern 
Western societies are infested with a distinctly new form 
of heteronomy:
What characterizes the contemporary world is of course 
crises, contradictions, oppositions, fractures, etc., but what 
strikes me above all is precisely insignificance. (Castoriadis 
2011, 5)
This omnipresent “insignificance” is nothing but the 
dramatic failure of citizens to challenge the dominant 
imaginary significations of contemporary liberal capital-
ism. What was particularly worrying to the discussants 
was the stifling of the creative capacity of the social 
sphere, giving rise to an unprecedented form of liberal 
conformism. The modern “complaisant nihilism,” as 
Octavio Paz labels it, (ibid., 26) is conspicuous in the 
political passivity and disenchantment following the 
dissolution of the grand political ideologies of the 20th 
century, as well as the waning of the liberalist idea of 
material and spiritual progress.  In Castoriadis’ system, 
this political conformity is a consequence of the clash 
of two modern political projects: the project of autono-
my and the project of rational mastery of nature. (ibid., 
31) But, it is precisely the incompatibility of the two 
that generates the precariousness of contemporary poli-
tics. The imposition of a single meta-value (“utility”) 
and a single insurmountable pole of social imagination 
(“unlimited consumption”) reduces all pluralities to an 
underlying homogenous base and hinders the process of 
self-determination so essential to politics. What is vital in 
order to jolt the contemporary citizen out of this hetero-
nomic slumber, Castoriadis and Paz agree, is a novel type 
of social-historical creation, an emergence of a “radically 
new” political frontier. (ibid., 37) Particularly interesting 
in the context of this quest for autonomy is Paz’s pro-
posal for restoration of the concept of the human person 
in light of contemporary developments in evolutionary 
theory. (ibid., 38)
Castoriadis’ conversation with the French psychoanalyst 
Jean-Luc Donnet reveals to the reader the systematic 
influences of Freudianism on the development of the 
concept of the “radical imaginary.” In an iconoclastic 
interpretation of the psychoanalytic “cure,” Castoriadis 
locates the primary role of the analytic encounter pre-
cisely in the liberation of the psychic imagination. (ibid., 
47) The cure, always emerging ex nihilo, is a catalyst in 
the production of an autonomous subject, permitting the 
“ego” to subtract itself from the authority of the rigidi-
fied Super-ego. Autonomy, as Donnet hauntingly avers 
echoing Freud, is the “capacity to entirely de-sexualize 
the figure of destiny.” (ibid., 52) The quest for novel so-
cial-historical significations must live up to the ultimate 
castration: the absence of pre-given meanings and norms. 
Yet, this absence in itself may be problematic for the 
universalist model propounded by Castoriadis. In a stim-
ulating interchange with the Belgian philosopher Robert 
Legros, Castoriadis attempts to respond to what Legros 
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labels “the Romanticist objection” to the project of au-
tonomy. (ibid., 96-97) Namely, if man is “nothing” by 
nature - if his social-historical existence is naturally un-
determined - then does not the project of breaking the 
“social closure” (the heteronomic cage of social laws) 
simply precipitate a dehumanization, a pointless search 
for an abstract subject extirpated from social particulari-
ties? Castoriadis is at his brilliant best when maneuvering 
among these conceptual poles. Lambasting the Romanticist 
lack of understanding of the critical attitude (the act of 
radical questioning of the origins of value), he accepts 
the social “embeddedness”  of the act of questioning, but 
refuses to render all conceptual traditions equal in value. 
(ibid., 98) In a distinctly Kantian move, he affirms the 
“tradition” of autonomy as an exigency to proliferate the 
questions of self-determination and freedom as (socially 
instilled) civilizational benefits. Man lives only by creating 
meaning and it is the understanding of this fact that is the 
sign of our intellectual maturity.
But, is it only man that has this incredible capacity to 
create meaning? Or can we envision machines that will 
eventually be our peers in the production of historical val-
ue? And, in that sense, what is this “radical imagination” 
if not a natural capacity of our psychic constitution? In a 
fascinating pair of dialogues with French mathematician 
Allain Connes and Chilean biologist Francisco Varela, 
Castoriadis castigates attempts by Artificial Intelligence 
enthusiasts to reduce human imagination to a system of 
cognitive mechanisms whose formalization we can, in 
a more or less successful manner, envision. And while 
in Connes, a vehement defender of a Platonist ontology 
of mathematics, Castoriadis finds a kindred mind, it is 
the intellectual encounter with Varela that most seriously 
shakes Castoriadis’ system. Varela - a creator of the the-
ory of biological autonomy that Castoriadis fervently 
endorses - presents what was (at that time) a radically new 
approach to the problematic of artificial life. Attempting 
to steer a middle way between classic biological reduc-
tionism and pure, undetermined “creation,” Varela lends 
from non-linear mathematics the notion of “emergence” 
- conceptualizing the creation of the “new” as a produc-
tion of global phenomena of physical systems irreducible 
to their constituent elements. (ibid., 68) However, op-
posing Castoriadis’ insistence on the strict impossibility 
of “simulating” intelligence, Varela is quick to point out 
that the resources of the theory of non-linear dynamics 
allow an experimenter to formalize the conditions of 
the possibility of emergence. (ibid.) In essence, “artifi-
cial autonomy” can be brought forward in the laboratory, 
since one has the necessary resources to describe and set 
up the essential conditions for emergence. And, while 
Castoriadis’ objections concerning the specific corporeal 
and social existence of human beings do hold sway, it is 
precisely the embodied and socially embedded character 
of cognition that is best captured by Varela’s anti-repre-
sentationalist turn.
Perhaps the most venerable facet of Postscript on 
Insignificance is the manner in which Castoriadis’ intel-
lectual encounters themselves open up broad vistas for a 
critical engagement with his system. In that sense, it is 
one of Octavio Paz’s minute quips that best captures this 
researcher’s qualms about Castoriadis’ system. If cre-
ation is not combination, what is it then? (ibid., 38) The 
appeal to an undetermined “radical” creation resembles 
what Dan Dennett calls a “skyhook” - a magical, mi-
raculous intervention that renders imagination possible. 
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(Dennett 1996, 74) But, even if one accepts this radical 
indeterminacy - the creative burst of the magmatic, if you 
will - it is not at all clear in what sense this would open up 
theoretical space for the institution of the creative imagi-
nation. As has been known since Hume, a simple rupture 
in the causal chain does not give us freedom and self-
determination, but merely randomness. (cf. Churchland 
2002, 232-233) And, while Castoriadis lambasts the 
positivists’ misrecognition of the creative as aleatory, it 
is he that has to explain what precisely makes this mere 
indeterminacy a “creation.” In an absence of a substan-
tial explanation, Castoriadis’ idiosyncratic employment 
of the notion has no ontological bearing and has to be 
clearly differentiated from the process of “subjective 
creation” essential to autonomy. However, Castoriadis’ 
system can best be refurbished with another, ontologi-
cally distinct, interpretation of imagination. And, it is 
precisely this interpretation that fuels Castoriadis’ most 
fertile engagements with the question of autonomy. There 
are two ways to make the distinction between the causal 
and the normative. The first would be to render this dis-
tinction itself a causal distinction. But, as we just saw, 
this leads us nowhere. On, the other hand, if - to borrow 
a trope overly familiar to German Idealism scholars - this 
distinction is itself made into a normative distinction, 
then the emergence of social creativity does not require 
causal indeterminacy. Normativity (and consequently 
self-determination) is instituted simply in the act of tak-
ing something “as” normative. Castoriadis is very close 
to such an approach with his insistence on the histori-
cal “emergence” of autonomy in Greco-Western culture, 
but the more general - and one must say “less ethnocen-
tric” - method of naturalization would give the notion of 
autonomy a universal footing that is sometimes sorely 
missing in his account. What would be naturalized in this 
project would not be the particular values and products 
of the norm-instituting creativity, but simply the formal 
attitudes of taking something as value-ridden and norma-
tive. Normativity will be created ex nihilo in a normative 
sense, but will be firmly grounded in the physical world. 5
This project of naturalization, however, gives rise to 
important questions concerning the natural place of 
Castoriadis’ “radical imagination.” Namely, to what ex-
tent does only man live by creating meaning? In their 
passionate dialogue, Francisco Varela exposed only the 
crux of his ideas, but a decade and a half later, we have 
both the further development of those ideas and the ben-
efit of hindsight in our favor. What in the mid-90s was a 
revolutionary research program in the cognitive sciences 
and the study of artificial life is today a well-established 
alternative to traditional (computer-inspired) represen-
tationalist views of the mind and cognition. And, based 
on what we now know6 it would be, without a doubt, 
rackingly hasty to propound the exclusivity of human 
sense-making or to a priori reject the possibility of simu-
lating “creative” intelligence. Castoriadis was adamant 
that only humans have the ability to “break the closure” 
of autopoiesis, (Castoriadis 2011, 60) but one of the main 
tenets of Varela’s “dynamical systems theory” is precise-
ly the idea that autopoietic closure does not necessarily 
contradict dynamic openness. Cognition is nothing but 
the structural, dynamical coupling of organism and en-
vironment, (cf. Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1992) and 
it is exactly the necessity of grappling with a particular 
environmental problem that jolts the imagination into a 
“creative” solution. All this, however, does not enervate 
the vitality of Castoriadis’ project of autonomy. Fifteen 
years later, the question why our political coping with 
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the social problems of contemporary Western societies 
has not “jolted” our imagination into a creative, radical 
solution has grown into the defining riddle of our age. 
And, although on dark days this question does resemble 
an unsolvable enigma, it is worth keeping in mind the 
natural “exigency of freedom” that fuels this very act of 
questioning. 
Postscript on Insignificance is a valuable addition to the 
steadily-growing library of English translations of one of 
the most versatile thinkers of the 20th century; but more 
importantly, it is a testament to the astonishing intellec-
tual curiosity of the thinker, Cornelius Castoriadis, the 
revolutionary.  
Notes:
1.   For a detailed overview of Castoriadis’ system see John Garner’s 
entry in the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. (Garner 2010).
2. Gabriel Rockhill’s comprehensive “editor’s introduction” to 
Postscript on Insignificance does a wonderful job of elucidating 
these ideas of Castoriadis’.
3.  Cf. “The Logic of Magmas and the Question of Autonomy,” in 
Castoriadis 1997, 290-318.
4. Cf. “The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy” in 
Castoriadis 1997.
5.  For this kind of an approach, see the inferentialism developed by 
Robert Brandom in Making it Explicit. (Brandom 1994)
6.  An engaging overview of these developments can be found in 
Mark Rowlands’ “The New Science of the Mind.” (Rowlands 
2010)
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